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INTERROGATION INVITES LIABILITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Cooper v. Dupnik/ the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
held that an interrogation scheme employed by the Tucson Po-
lice Department and the Pima County Sheriff's Department in-
tended to elicit a confession infringed on a suspect's constitu-
tional right to remain silent. 2 The scheme was specifically 
intended to compel involuntary testimony from a suspect by de-
liberately ignoring his repeated requests for an attorney.3 
The Ninth Circuit also held that Cooper had stated a claim 
sufficient for Section 1983 purposes.· In reaching this conclusion, 
1. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per Trott, J., with 
whom Browning, J., Hug, J., Schroeder, J., Fletcher, J., Poole, J., Thompson, J., and 
Wiggins, J., joined; Brunetti, J., and Leavy, J., dissenting). 
2. [d. at 1223. The court held that the interrogation scheme violated the fifth 
amendment. [d. at 1225. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "no per· 
son ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend V. 
3. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223. 
4. [d. at 1242. See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1988), providing in relevant part that "every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any 
State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
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the court held that the admissibility of a confession will not dic-
tate whether a valid Section 1983 claim has been established. 
The Ninth Circuit's decision affirmed the district court's denial 
of a motion .for summary judgment based on the defense of qual-
ified immunity. II 
II. FACTS 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On May 7, 1986, Michael Cooper became a suspect in the 
search for the Prime Time Rapist. e Cooper's fingerprints were 
compared and mistakenly identified as latent fingerprints lifted 
as evidence from one of the attack sights.7 Cooper, who was on 
probation for a fraud conviction,8 was formally arrested for the 
series of rapes in Tucson.9 
Prior to Cooper's arrest, the Tucson Police Chief and the 
Pima County Sheriff combined to form the Prime Time Rapist 
Task Force (the "Task Force"}.lo The Task Force, a compilation 
of experienced law-enforcement officers, was united to develop a 
strategy for interrogating suspects in the Prime Time Rapist 
case.ll The strategy consisted of ignoring the suspect's constitu-
tional right to remain silent; refusing any request to speak with 
an attorney; holding the suspect incommunicado; and pressuring 
and questioning the suspect until he confessed. 12 The officers 
knew that the confession generated from their tactics would be 
inadmissible as evidence in a prosecutor's case in chief, but they 
5. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1251. 
6. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1228 (9th Cir. 1992). Beginning in 1984, and 
extending through September of 1986, residents of Tucson, Arizona were beset by a se-
. ries of rapes, robberies and kidnapping. Id. at 1223. The Tucson Police Department and 
the Pima County Sheriff's Department believed a single individual might be responsible 
for the attacks. Id. That person became known as the "Prime Time Rapist." Id. 
7. Id. at 1228. An identification technician for the Tucson Police Department de-
cided, without authority, that Cooper might be a suspect. Id. The technician, who had 
not conducted any substantial fingerprint work for at least six (and possibly nine) years, 
compared the prints hastily and without following proper procedure. Id. His conclusion 
was that a positive comparison existed, although he had difficulty making a match. Id. 
The latent prints did not belong to Cooper. Id. 
8. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1229 n.3. 
9. Id. at 1229. 
10. Id. at 1223. 
11. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1224. 
12.Id. 
2
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hoped it would be admissible for impeachment purposes if the 
suspect ever went to trial.13 Furthermore, the officers hoped that 
the confession would prevent the suspect from claiming inno-
cence, and that it would hinder any possible insanity defense. 14 
During the interrogation, Cooper was fully advised of his 
Miranda rights.lI~ Cooper testified, however, that when the rights 
were admi'nistered, he did not take them seriously.16 This was 
the officers' intent, so that Cooper would talk with them. The 
officers interrogated Cooper persistently, deliberately ignoring 
his repeated requests for counsel.17 
Late in the interrogation, the detective designated as the 
primary interrogator concluded that Cooper was innocent. IS 
Even so, Cooper was eventually booked in the Pima County Jail, 
still proclaiming his innocence.19 The plan, though implemented 
with great intensity, was ineffective in yielding a confession.20 
Cooper had been told by a female fingerprint expert (with 
the Tucson Police Department) and the lead investigator that 
13. [d. (emphasis added). 
14. [d. 
15. [d.; Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (requiring that suspects held in 
custody be permitted to consult with an attorney prior to any interrogation, and allowing 
a suspect to remain silent with or without an attorney). The officers ignored Cooper's 
requests to contact an attorney. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1224. They doubted "very seriously" 
if he would speak to them at all after he contacted an attorney. [d. 
16. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1228. At the outset of the interview, which was recorded, the 
officer fully advised Cooper of his Miranda rights, but deliberately turned the advise-
ment into what he hoped Cooper would perceive as a joke. [d. The officer's ploy was 
designed to make Cooper ignore the warnings, and begin to talk. [d. The officer intended 
to undercut Cooper's constitutional right not to talk to the Task Force by complying 
with Miranda's safeguards in form only, not in spirit or in substance. [d. For example, 
the officer jokingly asked Cooper if Cooper had a rights card, and then said, "I could 
read you my driver's license if you like." [d. 
17. [d. at 1229. The record showed that Cooper was reduced to a state of agitation 
and anxiety marked by tears and sobbing as he persistently maintained his innocence in 
the face of the barrage of questioning. [d. at 1231. The record also contains evidence 
indicating he was traumatized by this encounter and later suffered post-traumatic stress 
syndrome. [d. 
18. [d. The detective, a. hardened veteran, testified that Cooper's emotional state 
caused him to conclude that Cooper was innocent. [d. The detective refused to interro-
gate Cooper any further, stating, "it was becoming clear to me that I could no longer 
deny my feelings that we got the wrong guy." [d. (emphasis added). 
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the Task Force had identified a positive fingerprint match.21 
Still, Cooper did not confess.22 Later that evening, the female 
fingerprint expert left the interrogation to double-check the ear-
lier comparison made by the technician.23 She concluded a mis-
take might have been made.24 Her advice was initially ignored 
by the first identification technician and his supervisor.21i The 
expert's concern eventually generated further examination of the 
fingerprint evidence, and led the technicians to conclude that 
they did not have a match.28 This was reported to the leading 
sergeant in the Sheriff's Department.27 
Nearly twenty-four hours after his arrest, Cooper was re-
leased.28 During his incarceration, despite two attempts to con-
tact an attorney, Cooper apparently had no contact with the 
outside world, including his family.29 
The evening of Cooper's arrest, the Sergeant told the media 
that the Prime Time Rapist had been apprehended.30 The next 
day, the Chief of Police explained to the media that Cooper had 
been misidentified by the crime lab.31 The FBI subsequently 
confirmed the mistake.32 Only then did the Tucson Police De-
partment publicly announce that Cooper had been cleared.33 
Cooper alleged that he and his family suffered serious per-
sonal and financial injury, and alleged nine causes of action 
21. Id. Despite the detective's misgivings, the lead investigator wanted to secure a 
confession. Id. The investigator summoned the fingerprint expert and told her, "I want 
to try to force a confession out of this man." Id. 
22.Id. 
23.Id. 
24. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1232. The expert testified that once removed from the 
"pressure" generated by the Task Force, she reached this conclusion. Id. 
25.Id. 
26. Id. at 1233. 
27. Id. at 1234. 
28. Id. at 1233. 
29.Id. 
30. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234. The Sergeant made this statement knowing that 
Cooper did not fit the physical description of the rapist given by the victims of the two 
rapes in question. Id. His superior also did not believe Cooper was responsible for these 
incidents. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. The confirmation of the mismatch came two months after Cooper's release. 
Id. 
33. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234. 
4
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and nine causes of action under state 
tort law.34 He named as defendants the law enforcement agen-
cies, the individual officers and their employers.311 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants on six of the federal causes of action. The court 
reasoned that the defendants successfully asserted the defense 
of qualified immunity.36 The defendants appealed from the dis-
trict court's denial of qualified immunity for Cooper's claims of 
(1) denial of right to counsel and right to remain silent, (2) in-
jury to reputation and property interests, and (3) conspiracy.37 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit focused on two issues: the denial of 
the right to counsel and of the right to remain silent.38 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The defendants argued that the record contained clear evi-
dence that they were entitled as a matter of law to the complete 
defense of qualified immunity as defined by the United States 
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 39 They further argued 
34. [d. The federal civil rights claims in Cooper's second amended complaint were: 
denial of right to counsel and right to remain silent; false arrest; false imprisonment; 
improper training and procedures; injury to reputation and property interests; invasion 
of privacy; illegal search and seizure (residence); illegal search and seizure (automobile); 
and conspiracy. [d. The state claims were not at issue on appeal. [d. 
35. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234. 
36. [d at 1235. 
37. [d. The court left intact the rulings of the district court as to the other counts. 
[d. 
38. [d. This case was originally heard on appeal by a Ninth Circuit three judge 
panel, which reversed all counts except a state defamation claim. [d. See also Cooper v. 
Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991). Cooper successfully petitioned for a rehearing en 
bane. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223. 
39. [d. at 1235. The court discussed the standard of review as well as the test to be 
applied for determining whether appellants are entitled to qualified immunity: 
An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's 
claim of immunity need not consider the plaintiff's version of 
the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allega-
tions actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question 
of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the de-
fendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged 
actions or, in cases where the district court has denied sum-
mary judgement for the defendant on the ground that even 
under the defendant's version of the facts the defendant's con-
duct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly 
proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took. 
[d. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985». 
5
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that continuing the interrogation in spite of Cooper's· request for 
counsel merely violated the safeguards set out in Miranda,4.0 and 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment substantive right to re-
main silent.41 The defendants argued that Cooper could not 
bring a claim under Section 1983 since they did not violate the 
Constitution.4.2 The defendants emphasized that Section 1983 re-
quires a violation of a "right ... secured by the Constitution" 
before imposing civil liability.4.S Furthermore, the defendants 
claimed that the only consequence of disregarding Miranda was 
that the evidence obtained might be inadmissible.44 
The district court's ruling turned mainly on whether the de-
fendants deprived Cooper of a constitutional right. The district 
court concluded that no such violation occurred, reasoning that 
Miranda warnings are merely procedural safeguards and are not 
mandatory.4.11 
On appeal, a three judge Ninth Circuit panel concluded that 
Cooper did not state a cause of action under Section 1983.46 The 
panel rejected Cooper's claim on four additional grounds. First, 
it held that Cooper's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not vi-
olated because Cooper did not confess to a crime. 4.7 Second, the 
panel overlooked Miranda's primary holding that the constitu-
tional right against compulsory self-incrimination (the right to 
remain silent) is applicable to suspects in police custody;4.S as a 
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra note 15 and accompanying 
text. 




45. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236. Besides stating that Miranda warnings are not consti-
tutionally mandated, the district court held there was no civil liability based upon the 
failure of the police to issue Miranda warnings. [d. (citing Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 
1520 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
46. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236 (citing Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1527). The panel noted that 
although his request for counsel was not honored, the Miranda warnings and rights are 
not themselves constitutionally mandated. [d. The panel stated that they are procedural 
safeguards, or prophylactic measures, to ensure that the fifth amendment right against 
compulsory incrimination is not violated. [d. The panel observed that all out-of-circuit 
cases held that a plaintiff may not, as a matter of law, maintain a § 1983 action based on 
the failure to issue Miranda warnings. . . Since Miranda requirements are not a consti-
tutional prerequisite, the panel concluded that their violation cannot form the basis of a 
§ 1983 suit. [d. 
47. Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1529. . 
48. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236 (citing Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1527 n.17). 
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result, the panel rejected Cooper's Fifth Amendment claim.49 
Third, the panel determined that Cooper's substantive due pro-
cess rights were not violated because the Task Force's conduct 
did not "shock the conscience".110 And fourth, the panel decided 
that all appellants were protected from suit by the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. III The Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, dis-
agreed with the majority of the original panel on each of these 
issues.1I2 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. COOPER'S STA~EMENTS 
Noting that Cooper made statements which could and prob-
ably would have been used against him had he gone to trial,1I3 
the Ninth Circuit held that it was irrelevant that the Task Force 
never secured a confession.1I4 The court held further that 
Cooper's statements hindered any insanity defense and therefore 
supported a constitutional violation.1I11 
The court concluded, based on Miranda, that Cooper's 
statements were sufficient to constitute a breach of his right to 
remain silent. liS The court reasoned that Miranda does not dis-
tinguish between statements which are direct confessions and 
statements which are partial admissions of an offense, since both 
types of statements are incriminating.1i7 
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The court held that the Task Force's motive was irrelevant, 
and concluded that its attempt to force Cooper's confession was 
49.Id. 
50.Id. 
51. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1237. The panel stated "there are simply no § 1983 substan-
tive due process cases with similar facts." Id. 
52. Id. at 1236. 
53. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir. 1992). Cooper admitted slap-
ping his wife, and that he often left his home, unaccompanied at night, sometimes for 
hours at a time. Id. 
54.Id. 
55. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1238. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at 1238 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77). 
7
Kepnes: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
150 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:143 
an attempt to compel him to be a witness against himself. liS The 
court reasoned that Miranda extends the Fifth Amendment 
right to interrogations in police stations as well as the courtroom 
itself.1i9 The court emphasized that Miranda warnings are not 
prophylactic safeguards, but protect a substantive constitutional 
right-the right to remain silent.6o Furthermore, the court inter-
preted Miranda as requiring the right to consult counsel prior to 
and during interrogation.61 The court noted that the rationale of 
Miranda is relevant to the present case as in-custody interroga-
tions can be overpowering to the suspect's will, thus the right to 
remain silent needs protection throughout the interrogation.62 
Once the accused has requested counsel, the interrogation must 
cease.6S 
The court concluded that if police conduct departed from 
prophylactic safeguards, such behavior was an abridgment of 
constitutional rights. The court emphasized that the nature of 
the interrogation made Cooper's statements compelled and in-
58.Id. 
59. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1239. The Court said: 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created 
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the 
will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of 
intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but 
it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current prac-
tice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of 
our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual 
may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Today, then, 
there can be no doubt that the fifth amendment privilege is 
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to 
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of ac-
tion is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled 
to incriminate themselves. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (em-
phasis added). 
62. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70). Even preliminary 
advice given to the accused by his own attorney can swiftly be overcome by the secret 
interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to protect the fifth amendment privilege 
is not merely the right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have 
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
469-70. 
63. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240. See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), in 
which the Supreme Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's request for 
an attorney is per se an invocation of his fifth amendment rights, requiring that all inter-
rogation cease." Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240 (citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 719). 
8
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voluntary.64 Cooper's repeated requests for counsel were treated 
with indifference and he was continuously badgered in order to 
force a confession.6& The court reasoned that since the right 
against self-incrimination was designed to protect against this 
type of police misconduct, Cooper had a Fifth Amendment cause 
of action under Section 1983.66 
C. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Ninth Circuit maintained that the coercive police ac-
tion alone violated due process; the actual use or attempted use 
of the coerced statement was not necessary to complete the af-
front to the Constitution.67 The court held that Cooper's civil 
rights cause of action was not contingent on Cooper being for-
mally charged, nor on his statements being offered as evidence.68 
The court observed that the detrimental use of the coerced 
statements becomes relevant when determining damages.69 
The Ninth Circuit also held that a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not require physi-
cal coercion.70 The court reasoned that the law governing co-
erced confessions is clear; the Fourteenth Amendment demands 
that confessions be the voluntary product of a free and uncon-
strained will. 71 The court concluded that Cooper's statements to 
the Task Force did not meet this standard. He was emotionally 
worn down, stressed and filled with a sense of helplessness and 
fear. 72 Statements made under these conditions are clearly for-
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 73. 
64. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1241 (citing Miranda, 634 U.S. at 456-58). It is obvious that 
such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the 
individual to the will of his examiner. . . no statement obtained from the defendant can 
truly be the product of his free choice. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242. 
65. Id. at 1243. The approach was described by an officer as "hammering," and the 
questioning was harsh and unrelenting. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 
(1960) (recognizing that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of 
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition). 
66. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244. 




71. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1247. 
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D. THE POLICE CONDUCT "SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE" 
The Ninth Circuit held that Cooper could also claim that 
the defendants' behavior "shocks the conscience," in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, providing him with a second cause 
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7• The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that although police brutality is the most frequent example of a 
substantive due process violation, other violations can occur.711 
The court recognized that the police behavior in this case' was 
intended to prevent Cooper from testifying, and that the Task 
Force attempted to utilize unlawful tactics to use Cooper's state-
merits to impeach him and deny him use of an insanity de-
fense. 76 This deliberate ignorance of constitutional standards in-
fringed on Cooper's inalienable rights, and is thus a "shock to 
the system."77 
E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Once determining that the Task Force violated Cooper's 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the court turned to 
the question of whether the Task Force could successfully rely 
on qualified immunity as a defense.78 
The doctrine of qualified immunity was designed to ensure 
that officials would not be "chilled" in the proper exercise of 
their public duties, but is inapplicable when an official know-
ingly violates the law.79 The standard for determining whether 
the defense is applicable is objective. Officials will be liable 'when 
their behavior falls below the reasonable person standard.80 The 
74. [do See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) which outlawed all police 
conduct that "offends those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of 
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
offenses." [do at 172. 
75. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1249. 
76. [do at 1250. 
77. [d. 
78. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1251. 
79. [do (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524). "Under the standard of qualified immunity 
... [an official) will be entitled to immunity so long as his actions do not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have 
known. This standard will not allow him to carry out his ... functions wholly free from 
concern for his personal liability . . . Where an official could be expected to know that 
his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesi-
tate .... " [d. ' 
80. Cooper, at 1251. See supra note 63 setting forth the standard for applying the 
10
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depositions of the Task Force members show that they knew 
they were violating Cooper's Constitutional rights, yet they con-
sciously continued with their actions.81 The court thus con-
cluded that the defendants violated Cooper's rights and met the 
criteria set forth in Mitchell. 82 The qualified immunity defense 
is therefore inapplicable.83 
F. CONCURRENCE 
According to the majority, the violation of Cooper's Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent gave rise to Section 1983 lia-
bility.84 In contrast, the concurrence noted that the decision in 
this case does not expand liability under Section 1983 to include 
ordinary Miranda rights violations.811 Because a suspect does not 
have a constitutional right to Miranda warnings, the rights are 
simply a prophylactic device designed to protect the right to re-
main silent.8s The concurrence recognized that in this case, how-
ever, Cooper's request for counsel was a per se invocation of the 
constitutional right to remain silent.87 Thus, the violation of 
Cooper's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and not the 
Miranda violations, gave rise to Section 1983 liability.88 
G. DISSENT 
The dissent emphasized that Cooper's statements would 
have been suppressed in any criminal proceeding.89 Cooper could 
not incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
once the evidence was suppressed.90 The dissent argued that it is 
the use of coerced statements that constitutes a Fifth Amend-
ment violation.91 Since there was no use of the statements, there 
doctrine of qualified immunity. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. The court further concluded that it was irrelevant that the appellants hoped 
that the confession would be deemed voluntary. This is not a subjective standard. Id. 
84. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253. 
85. Id. at 1252. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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was no constitutional violation.92 Thus, the dissent argued, there 
is no remedy available to Cooper under Section 1983.93 
The dissent also argued that Cooper did not state a valid 
Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the police did 
not "shock the conscience" with their conduct.94 Although the 
behavior might have been extreme, the dissent stated that it was 
hardly "sophisticated psychological torture,"as the majority in-
sists.911 The dissent argued that there can be no Section 1983 lia-
bility when police conduct does not violate substantive due 
process.96 
v. CONCLUSION 
In Cooper v. Dupnik,97 the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
liberate denial of a suspect's requests for counsel and continuous 
interrogation specifically intended to compel a confession vio-
lated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.98 The court held 
that any violation by the police is complete at the time of the 
offending behavior, and such behavior "shocks the conscience" 
because it denies a citizen the right against self-incrimination.99 
The court emphasized that when officials deliberately choose to 
ignore the law in favor of their own methods, they attempt to 
render the Constitution useless, and will be found liable under 
Section 1983.100 
Stacey L. Kepnes* 
92. [d. 
93. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253. 
94. [d. at 1255. 
95. [d. The dissent did not defend the police techniques, but noted that Cooper was 
not physically assaulted, nor was he deprived of sleep, nor was he subjected to incommu-
nicado interrogation over a period of days. [d. His interrogation lasted only four hours 
and consisted of rough questioning by the police. [d. 
96. [d. at 1256. 
97. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992). 
98. [d. at 1251. 
99. [d. at 1252. 
100. [d. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
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